Paper 1997/007 Original: eprint.iacr.org/1997/007 ↗
Towards realizing random oracles: Hash functions that hide all partial information
Abstract
The random oracle model is a very convenient setting for designing cryptographic protocols. In this idealized model all parties have access to a common, public random function, called a random oracle. Protocols in this model are often very simple and efficient; also the analysis is often clearer. However, we do not have a general mechanism for transforming protocols that are secure in the random oracle model into protocols that are secure in real life. In fact, we do not even know how to meaningfully specify the properties required from such a mechanism. Instead, it is a common practice to simply replace - often without mathematical justification - the random oracle with a `cryptographic hash function' (e.g., MD5 or SHA). Consequently, the resulting protocols have no meaningful proofs of security.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 1997-06-02: last updated
- 1997-06-02: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/1997/007
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:1997/007,
author = {Ran Canetti},
title = {Towards realizing random oracles: Hash functions that hide all partial information},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 1997/007},
year = {1997},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/1997/007}
}