The Random Oracle Methodology, Revisited

Ran Canetti; Oded Goldreich; Shai Halevi

Paper 1998/011 Original: eprint.iacr.org/1998/011 ↗

The Random Oracle Methodology, Revisited

Ran Canetti

Oded Goldreich

Shai Halevi

Abstract

We take a critical look at the relationship between the security of cryptographic schemes in the Random Oracle Model, and the security of the schemes that result from implementing the random oracle by so called "cryptographic hash functions". The main result of this paper is a negative one: There exist signature and encryption schemes that are secure in the Random Oracle Model, but for which any implementation of the random oracle results in insecure schemes. In the process of devising the above schemes, we consider possible definitions for the notion of a "good implementation" of a random oracle, pointing out limitations and challenges.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Foundations
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2003-08-04: last updated; 2003-08-04: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/1998/011
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:1998/011,
      author = {Ran Canetti and Oded Goldreich and Shai Halevi},
      title = {The Random Oracle Methodology, Revisited},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 1998/011},
      year = {1998},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/1998/011}
}