Interleaved Zero-Knowledge in the Public-Key Model

Oded Goldreich; Shafi Goldwasser; Silvio Micali

Paper 1999/015 Original: eprint.iacr.org/1999/015 ↗

Interleaved Zero-Knowledge in the Public-Key Model

Oded Goldreich

Shafi Goldwasser

Silvio Micali

Abstract

We introduce the notion of Interleaved Zero-Knowledge (iZK), a new security measure for cryptographic protocols which strengthens the classical notion of zero-knowledge, in a way suitable for multiple concurrent executions in an asynchronous environment like the internet. We prove that iZK protocols are robust: they are ``parallelizable'', and preserve security when run concurrently in a fully asynchronous network. Furthermore, this holds even if the prover's random-pads in all these concurrent invocations are identical. Thus, iZK protocols are ideal for smart-cards and other devices which cannot reliably

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 1999-07-09: last updated; 1999-06-26: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/1999/015
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:1999/015,
      author = {Oded Goldreich and Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali},
      title = {Interleaved Zero-Knowledge in the Public-Key Model},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 1999/015},
      year = {1999},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/1999/015}
}