Paper 2000/015 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2000/015 ↗
Identification Protocols Secure Against Reset Attacks
Abstract
We provide identification protocols that are secure even when the adversary can reset the internal state and/or randomization source of the user identifying itself, and when executed in an asynchronous environment like the Internet that gives the adversary concurrent access to instances of the user. These protocols are suitable for use by devices (like smartcards) which when under adversary control may not be able to reliably maintain their internal state between invocations.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2001-09-20: last updated
- 2000-04-28: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2000/015
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2000/015,
author = {Mihir Bellare and Marc Fischlin and Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali},
title = {Identification Protocols Secure Against Reset Attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2000/015},
year = {2000},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2000/015}
}