Paper 2000/059 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2000/059 ↗
Essential Shannon Security with Keys Smaller Than the Encrypted Message
Abstract
To a cryptographer the claim that “Shannon Security was achieved with keys smaller than the encrypted message" appears unworthy of attention, much as the claim of “perpetuum mobile” is to a physicist. Albeit, from an engineering point of view solar cells which power satellites exhibit an “essential perpetuum mobile” and are of great interest. Similarly for Shannon Security, as it is explored in this article. We discuss encryption schemes designed to confound a diligent cryptanalyst who works his way from a captured ciphertext to a disappointing endpoint where more than one otherwise plausible plaintexts are found to be associated with keys that encrypt them to that ciphertext. Unlike some previous researchers who explored this equivocation as a special case of existing schemes, this approach is aimed at devising a symmetric encryption for that purpose per se.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2000-12-27: last updated
- 2000-11-17: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2000/059
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2000/059,
author = {Gideon Samid},
title = {Essential Shannon Security with Keys Smaller Than the Encrypted Message},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2000/059},
year = {2000},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2000/059}
}