Paper 2001/002 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2001/002 ↗
The One-More-RSA-Inversion Problems and the Security of Chaum's Blind Signature Scheme
Abstract
We introduce a new class of computational problems which we call the ``one-more-RSA-inversion'' problems. Our main result is that two problems in this class, which we call the chosen-target and known-target inversion problems respectively, have polynomially-equivalent computational complexity. We show how this leads to a proof of security for Chaum's RSA-based blind signature scheme in the random oracle model based on the assumed hardness of either of these problems. We define and prove analogous results for ``one-more-discrete-logarithm'' problems. Since the appearence of the preliminary version of this paper, the new problems we have introduced have found other uses as well.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2002-06-17: last updated
- 2001-01-05: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2001/002
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2001/002,
author = {M. Bellare and C. Namprempre and D. Pointcheval and M. Semanko},
title = {The One-More-RSA-Inversion Problems and the Security of Chaum's Blind Signature Scheme},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2001/002},
year = {2001},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/002}
}