Paper 2001/031 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2001/031 ↗

Efficient Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Using Human-Memorable Passwords

Jonathan Katz
Rafail Ostrovsky
Moti Yung
Abstract

We present an efficient password-authenticated key exchange protocol which is secure against off-line dictionary attacks even when users choose passwords from a very small space (say, a dictionary of English words). We prove security in the standard model under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, assuming public parameters generated by a trusted party. Compared to the recent work of Goldreich and Lindell (which was the first to give a secure construction, under general assumptions, in the standard model), our protocol requires only 3 rounds and is efficient enough to be used in practice.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2001-04-27: last updated
2001-04-27: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2001/031
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2001/031,
      author = {Jonathan Katz and Rafail Ostrovsky and Moti Yung},
      title = {Efficient Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Using Human-Memorable Passwords},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2001/031},
      year = {2001},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/031}
}
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