Paper 2001/035 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2001/035 ↗

Forward-Security in Private-Key Cryptography

Mihir Bellare
Bennet Yee
Abstract

This paper provides a comprehensive treatment of forward-security in the context of shared-key based cryptographic primitives, as a practical means to mitigate the damage caused by key-exposure. We provide definitions of security, practical proven-secure constructions, and applications for the main primitives in this area. We identify forward-secure pseudorandom bit generators as the central primitive, providing several constructions and then showing how forward-secure message authentication schemes and symmetric encryption schemes can be built based on standard schemes for these problems coupled with forward-secure pseudorandom bit generators. We then apply forward-secure message authentication schemes to the problem of maintaining secure access logs in the presence of break-ins.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2002-11-18: last updated
2001-05-06: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2001/035
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2001/035,
      author = {Mihir Bellare and Bennet Yee},
      title = {Forward-Security in Private-Key Cryptography},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2001/035},
      year = {2001},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/035}
}
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