Paper 2001/035 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2001/035 ↗
Forward-Security in Private-Key Cryptography
Abstract
This paper provides a comprehensive treatment of forward-security in the context of shared-key based cryptographic primitives, as a practical means to mitigate the damage caused by key-exposure. We provide definitions of security, practical proven-secure constructions, and applications for the main primitives in this area. We identify forward-secure pseudorandom bit generators as the central primitive, providing several constructions and then showing how forward-secure message authentication schemes and symmetric encryption schemes can be built based on standard schemes for these problems coupled with forward-secure pseudorandom bit generators. We then apply forward-secure message authentication schemes to the problem of maintaining secure access logs in the presence of break-ins.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2002-11-18: last updated
- 2001-05-06: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2001/035
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2001/035,
author = {Mihir Bellare and Bennet Yee},
title = {Forward-Security in Private-Key Cryptography},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2001/035},
year = {2001},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/035}
}