EMpowering Side-Channel Attacks

Josyula R.  Rao; Pankaj Rohatgi

Paper 2001/037 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2001/037 ↗

EMpowering Side-Channel Attacks

Josyula R. Rao

Pankaj Rohatgi

Abstract

In this paper, we report preliminary results obtained as a result of a systematic investigation of leakage of compromising information via EM emanations from chipcards and other devices. Our findings show that the EM side--channel is more powerful than other side--channels such as timing and power analysis. Specifically, in some cases, one can obtain much more compromising information about computations and one can use this information to defeat the protection provided by countermeasures to the other side--channel attacks.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Implementation
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2001-05-11: last updated; 2001-05-11: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2001/037
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2001/037,
      author = {Josyula R.  Rao and Pankaj Rohatgi},
      title = {EMpowering Side-Channel Attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2001/037},
      year = {2001},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/037}
}