Paper 2001/060 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2001/060 ↗
The Security of Practical Two-Party RSA Signature Schemes
Abstract
In a two-party RSA signature scheme, a client and server, each holding a share of an RSA decryption exponent $d$, collaborate to compute an RSA signature under the corresponding public key $N,e$ known to both. This primitive is of growing interest in the domain of server-aided password-based security, where the client's share of $d$ is based on its password. To minimize cost, designers are looking at very simple, practical protocols based on the early ideas of Boyd, but their security is unclear. We analyze a class of these protocols. We suggest two notions of security for two-party signature schemes and provide proofs of security for the schemes in our class based on assumptions about RSA and the hash function underlying the scheme.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2002-06-10: last updated
- 2001-07-29: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2001/060
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2001/060,
author = {Mihir Bellare and Ravi Sandhu},
title = {The Security of Practical Two-Party RSA Signature Schemes},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2001/060},
year = {2001},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/060}
}