Paper 2001/078 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2001/078 ↗

The COS Stream Ciphers are Extremely Weak

Steve Babbage
Abstract

A new family of very fast stream ciphers called COS (for "crossing over system") has been proposed by Filiol and Fontaine, and seems to have been adopted for at least one commercial standard. In this note we show that the COS ciphers are very weak indeed — it requires negligible effort to reconstruct the state of the keystream generator from a very small amount of known keystream.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2001-09-11: last updated
2001-09-11: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2001/078
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2001/078,
      author = {Steve Babbage},
      title = {The COS Stream Ciphers are Extremely Weak},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2001/078},
      year = {2001},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/078}
}
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