COS Ciphers are not "extremely weak"! - The Design Rationale of COS Ciphers

Eric Filiol; Caroline Fontaine

Paper 2001/080 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2001/080 ↗

COS Ciphers are not "extremely weak"! - The Design Rationale of COS Ciphers

Eric Filiol

Caroline Fontaine

Abstract

This note summarizes the results of Babbage's cryptanalysis of COS ciphers and shows that in fact COS ciphers are not weak as claimed. These ciphers have been designed according a novel concept of encryption directly determined by the context of use. This concept is here more precisely defined.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2001-09-17: last updated; 2001-09-17: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2001/080
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2001/080,
      author = {Eric Filiol and Caroline Fontaine},
      title = {COS Ciphers are not "extremely weak"! - The Design Rationale of COS Ciphers},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2001/080},
      year = {2001},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/080}
}