Paper 2002/035 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2002/035 ↗
Tripartite Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols from Pairings
Abstract
Joux's protocol is a one round, tripartite key agreement protocol that is more bandwidth-efficient than any previous three-party key agreement protocol. But it is insecure, suffering from a simple man-in-the-middle attack. This paper shows how to make Joux's protocol secure, presenting several tripartite, authenticated key agreement protocols that still require only one round of communication. A pass-optimal authenticated and key confirmed tripartite protocol that generalises the station-to-station protocol is also presented. The security properties of the new protocols are studied using provable security methods and heuristic approaches. Applications for the protocols are also discussed.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2003-04-16: last updated
- 2002-03-20: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2002/035
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2002/035,
author = {Sattam S. Al-Riyami and Kenneth G. Paterson},
title = {Tripartite Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols from Pairings},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2002/035},
year = {2002},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/035}
}