Paper 2002/075 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2002/075 ↗

Fault based cryptanalysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard

Abstract

In this paper we describe several fault attacks on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). First, using optical fault induction attacks as recently publicly presented by Skorobogatov and Anderson \cite{SA}, we present an implementation independent fault attack on AES. This attack is able to determine the complete $128$-bit secret key of a sealed tamper-proof smartcard by generating $128$ faulty cipher texts. Second, we present several implementation-dependent fault attacks on AES. These attacks rely on the observation that due to the AES's known timing analysis vulnerability (as pointed out by Koeune and Quisquater \cite{KQ}), any implementation of the AES must ensure a data independent timing behavior for the so called AES's {\tt xtime} operation. We present fault attacks on AES based on various timing analysis resistant implementations of the {\tt xtime}-operation. Our strongest attack in this direction uses a very liberal fault model and requires only $256$ faulty encryptions to determine a $128$-bit key.