Provably Secure Steganography

Nicholas J.  Hopper; John Langford; Luis von Ahn

Paper 2002/137 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2002/137 ↗

Provably Secure Steganography

Nicholas J. Hopper

John Langford

Luis von Ahn

Abstract

Informally, steganography is the process of sending a secret message from Alice to Bob in such a way that an eavesdropper (who listens to all communications) cannot even tell that a secret message is being sent. In this work, we initiate the study of steganography from a complexity-theoretic point of view. We introduce definitions based on computational indistinguishability and we prove that the existence of one-way functions implies the existence of secure steganographic protocols. NOTE: An extended abstract of this paper appeared in CRYPTO 2002. Here we present a full version, including a correction to a small error in Construction 1.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Foundations
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2002-09-12: last updated; 2002-09-12: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2002/137
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2002/137,
      author = {Nicholas J.  Hopper and John Langford and Luis von Ahn},
      title = {Provably Secure Steganography},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2002/137},
      year = {2002},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/137}
}