Key recovery attacks on NTRU without ciphertext validation routine

Daewan Han; Jin Hong; Jae Woo Han; Daesung Kwon

Paper 2002/188 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2002/188 ↗

Key recovery attacks on NTRU without ciphertext validation routine

Daewan Han

Jin Hong

Jae Woo Han

Daesung Kwon

Abstract

NTRU is an efficient public-key cryptosystem proposed by Hoffstein, Pipher, and Silverman. Assuming access to a decryption oracle, we show ways to recover the private key of NTRU systems that do not include a ciphertext validating procedure. The strongest of our methods will employ just a single call to the oracle, and in all cases, the number of calls needed will be small enough to be realistic.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2003-04-19: last updated; 2002-12-12: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2002/188
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2002/188,
      author = {Daewan Han and Jin Hong and Jae Woo Han and Daesung Kwon},
      title = {Key recovery attacks on NTRU without ciphertext validation routine},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2002/188},
      year = {2002},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/188}
}