Paper 2003/033 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2003/033 ↗
Integral Cryptanalysis on reduced-round Safer++
Abstract
In this paper we describe an integral distinguisher over 2 rounds of Safer++. It allows a practical attack against 3 rounds of Safer++128, as well as attacks on 4 rounds of Safer++128 and Safer++256, under the chosen-plaintext hypothesis. These results achieve much lower complexity than the currently known best attacks on Safer++, namely weak-key linear cryptanalysis by Nakahara. As a side result, we prove that the byte-branch number of the linear transform of Safer++ is 5. We also discuss a way for further research in order to extend integral cryptanalysis.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2003-02-18: last updated
- 2003-02-18: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2003/033
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/033,
author = {Gilles Piret and Jean-Jacques Quisquater},
title = {Integral Cryptanalysis on reduced-round Safer++},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2003/033},
year = {2003},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/033}
}