Paper 2003/038 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2003/038 ↗
Pretty-Simple Password-Authenticated Key-Exchange Under Standard Assumptions
Abstract
In this paper, we propose a pretty-simple password-authenticated key-exchange protocol, which is proven to be secure in the standard model under the following three assumptions. (1) DDH (Decision Diffie-Hellman) problem is hard. (2) The entropy of the password is large enough to avoid on-line exhaustive search (but not necessarily off-line exhaustive search). (3) MAC is selectively unforgeable against partially chosen message attacks, (which is weaker than being existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2003-02-27: last updated
- 2003-02-27: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2003/038
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/038,
author = {Kazukuni Kobara and Hideki Imai},
title = {Pretty-Simple Password-Authenticated Key-Exchange Under Standard Assumptions},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2003/038},
year = {2003},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/038}
}