Paper 2003/063 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2003/063 ↗
Initiator-Resilient Universally Composable Key Exchange
Abstract
Key exchange protocols in the setting of universal composability are investigated. First we show that the ideal functionality F_KE of [CK02] cannot be realized in the presence of adaptive adversaries, thereby disproving a claim in [CK02]. We proceed to propose a modification F_KE^(i,j), which is proven to be realizable by two natural protocols for key exchange. Furthermore, sufficient conditions for securely realizing this modified functionality are given. Two notions of key exchange are introduced that allow for security statements even when one party is corrupted. Two natural key exchange protocols are proven to fulfill the "weaker" of these notions, and a construction for deriving protocols that satisfy the "stronger" notion is given.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2003-11-25: last updated
- 2003-04-08: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2003/063
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/063,
author = {Dennis Hofheinz and Joern Mueller-Quade and Rainer Steinwandt},
title = {Initiator-Resilient Universally Composable Key Exchange},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2003/063},
year = {2003},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/063}
}