Paper 2003/082 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2003/082 ↗
Stronger Security Bounds for OMAC, TMAC and XCBC
Abstract
OMAC, TMAC and XCBC are CBC-type MAC schemes which are provably secure for arbitrary message length. In this paper, we present a more tight upper bound on ${\tt Adv}^{\sf mac}$ for each scheme, where ${\tt Adv}^{\sf mac}$ denotes the maximum success (forgery) probability of adversaries. Our bounds are expressed in terms of the \textit{total length} of all queries of an adversary to the MAC generation oracle while the previous bounds are expressed in terms of the \textit{maximum length} of each query. In particular, a significant improvement occurs if the lengths of queries are heavily unbalanced.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2003-04-30: last updated
- 2003-04-30: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2003/082
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/082,
author = {Tetsu Iwata and Kaoru Kurosawa},
title = {Stronger Security Bounds for OMAC, TMAC and XCBC},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2003/082},
year = {2003},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/082}
}