Paper 2003/100 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2003/100 ↗
Protocols for Bounded-Concurrent Secure Two-Party Computation in the Plain Model
Abstract
Until recently, most research on the topic of secure computation focused on the stand-alone model, where a single protocol execution takes place. In this paper, we construct protocols for the setting of {\em bounded-concurrent self composition}, where a (single) secure protocol is run many times concurrently, and there is a predetermined bound on the number of concurrent executions. In short, we show that {\em any} two-party functionality can be securely computed under bounded-concurrent self composition, in the {\sf plain model} (where the only setup assumption made is that the parties communicate via authenticated channels). Our protocol provides the first feasibility result for general two-party computation in the plain model, {\em for any model of concurrency}. All previous protocols assumed a trusted setup phase in order to obtain a common reference string. On the downside, the number of rounds of communication in our protocol is super-linear in the bound on the number of concurrent executions. However, we believe that our constructions will lead to more efficient protocols for this task.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2004-05-18: last updated
- 2003-05-23: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2003/100
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/100,
author = {Yehuda Lindell},
title = {Protocols for Bounded-Concurrent Secure Two-Party Computation in the Plain Model},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2003/100},
year = {2003},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/100}
}