Paper 2003/129 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2003/129 ↗

Attack on Han et al.'s ID-based Confirmer (Undeniable) Signature at ACM-EC'03

Fangguo Zhang
Reihaneh Safavi-Naini
Willy Susilo
Abstract

At the fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce (EC'03), S. Han, K.Y. Yeung and J. Wang proposed an ID-based confirmer signature scheme using pairings (actually, this is an ID-based undeniable signature scheme). However, in this paper, we will show that this signature scheme is not secure. The signer can deny any signature, even this signature is his valid signature and any one can forge a valid confirmer signature of a signer with identity ID on an arbitrary message and confirm this signature to the verifier.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2003-08-12: last updated
2003-07-03: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2003/129
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/129,
      author = {Fangguo Zhang and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini and Willy Susilo},
      title = {Attack on Han et al.'s ID-based Confirmer (Undeniable) Signature at ACM-EC'03},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2003/129},
      year = {2003},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/129}
}
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