Paper 2003/196 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2003/196 ↗
Security Analysis of Some Proxy Signatures
Abstract
A proxy signature scheme allows an entity to delegate his/her signing capability to another entity in such a way that the latter can sign messages on behalf of the former. Such schemes have been suggested for use in a number of applications, particularly in distributed computing where delegation of rights is quite common. Followed by the first schemes introduced by Mambo, Usuda and Okamoto in 1996, a number of new schemes and improvements have been proposed. In this paper, we present a security analysis of four such schemes newly proposed in [15,16]. By successfully identifying several interesting forgery attacks, we show that all the four schemes are insecure. Consequently, the fully distributed proxy scheme in [11] is also insecure since it is based on the (insecure) LKK scheme [14,15]. In addition, we point out the reasons why the security proofs provided in [15] are invalid.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2004-04-12: last updated
- 2003-09-24: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2003/196
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/196,
author = {Guilin Wang and Feng Bao and Jianying Zhou and Robert H. Deng},
title = {Security Analysis of Some Proxy Signatures},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2003/196},
year = {2003},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/196}
}