Paper 2003/229 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2003/229 ↗
Algebraic Attacks on Summation Generators
Abstract
We apply the algebraic attacks on stream ciphers with memories to the summation generator. For a summation generator that uses $n$ LFSRs, the algebraic equation relating the key stream bits and LFSR output bits can be made to be of degree less than or equal to $2^{\lceil\log_2 n \rceil}$, using $\lceil\log_2 n \rceil + 1$ consecutive key stream bits. This is much lower than the upper bound given by previous general results.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2008-08-06: last updated
- 2003-11-06: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2003/229
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/229,
author = {Dong Hoon Lee and Jaeheon Kim and Jin Hong and Jae Woo Han and Dukjae Moon},
title = {Algebraic Attacks on Summation Generators},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2003/229},
year = {2003},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/229}
}