Paper 2003/233 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2003/233 ↗
Public Key Steganography
Abstract
Informally, a public-key steganography protocol allows two parties, who have never met or exchanged a secret, to send hidden messages over a public channel so that an adversary cannot even detect that these hidden messages are being sent. Unlike previous settings in which provable security has been applied to steganography, public-key steganography is information-theoretically impossible. In this work we introduce computational security conditions for public-key steganography similar to those introduced by Hopper, Langford and von Ahn for the private-key setting. We also give the first protocols for public-key steganography and steganographic key exchange that are provably secure under standard cryptographic assumptions. Additionally, in the random oracle model, we present a protocol that is secure against adversaries that have access to a decoding oracle (the steganographic equivalent of CCA-2 adversaries).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2003-11-08: last updated
- 2003-11-08: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2003/233
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/233,
author = {Luis von Ahn and Nicholas J. Hopper},
title = {Public Key Steganography},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2003/233},
year = {2003},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/233}
}