Paper 2003/259 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2003/259 ↗
Attack on Two ID-based Authenticated Group Key Agreement Schemes
Abstract
Authenticated group key agreement problem is important in many modern collaborative and distributed applications. Recently, there are two ID-based authenticated group key agreement schemes have been proposed, one is Choi $et\ al.$'s \cite{CHL04} scheme, the other is Du $et\ al.$'s \cite{Du03} scheme. They are all constructed from bilinear pairings based on Burmester and Desmedt scheme \cite{BD94}. In this paper, we propose an impersonation attack on the two schemes. We show that any two malicious users can impersonate an entity to agree some session keys in a new group if these two malicious users have the previous authentication transcripts of this entity. So, the two ID-based authenticated group key agreement schemes can not provide the authenticity as claimed. We propose a proposal to repair these schemes.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2003-12-20: last updated
- 2003-12-20: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2003/259
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/259,
author = {Fangguo Zhang and Xiaofeng Chen},
title = {Attack on Two ID-based Authenticated Group Key Agreement Schemes},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2003/259},
year = {2003},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/259}
}