Security Analysis of Lal and Awasthi's Proxy Signature Schemes

Manik Lal Das; Ashutosh Saxena; V   P  Gulati

Paper 2003/263 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2003/263 ↗

Security Analysis of Lal and Awasthi's Proxy Signature Schemes

Manik Lal Das

Ashutosh Saxena

V P Gulati

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze two proxy signatures scheme [1], [2] proposed by Lal and Awasthi and found that both the schemes suffer with the security flaws. The scheme [1] suffers with proxy signer's forgery attacks and misuse of original signer's delegated information. The other scheme [2] suffers with original signer's forgery attack, proxy signer's undeniability and misuse of delegated information.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2004-01-01: last updated; 2004-01-01: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2003/263
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/263,
      author = {Manik Lal Das and Ashutosh Saxena and V   P  Gulati},
      title = {Security Analysis of Lal and Awasthi's Proxy Signature Schemes},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2003/263},
      year = {2003},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/263}
}