Paper 2004/081 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2004/081 ↗
Rewriting Variables: the Complexity of Fast Algebraic Attacks on Stream Ciphers
Abstract
Recently proposed algebraic attacks [AK03,CM03] and fast algebraic attacks [A04,C03] have provided the best analyses against some deployed LFSR-based ciphers. The process complexity is exponential in the degree of the equations. Fast algebraic attacks were introduced [C03] as a way of reducing run-time complexity by reducing the degree of the system of equations. Previous reports on fast algebraic attacks [A04,C03] have underestimated the complexity of substituting the keystream into the system of equations, which in some cases dominates the attack. We also show how the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) [CT65] can be applied to decrease the complexity of the substitution step, although in one case this step still dominates the attack complexity. Finally, we show that all functions of degree d satisfy a common, function-independent linear combination that may be used in the pre-computation step of the fast algebraic attack and provide an explicit factorization of the corresponding characteristic polynomial. This yields the fastest known method for performing the pre-computation step.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2004-03-16: last updated
- 2004-03-16: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2004/081
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/081,
author = {Philip Hawkes and Gregory G. Rose},
title = {Rewriting Variables: the Complexity of Fast Algebraic Attacks on Stream Ciphers},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/081},
year = {2004},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/081}
}