Paper 2004/105 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2004/105 ↗
Receipt-Free Homomorphic Elections and Write-in Ballots
Abstract
We present a voting protocol that protects voters' privacy and achieves universal verifiability, receipt-freeness, and uncoercibility without ad hoc physical assumptions or procedural constraints (such as untappable channels, voting booths, smart cards, third-party randomizers, and so on). We discuss under which conditions the scheme allows voters to cast write-in ballots, and we show how it can be practically implemented through voter-verified (paper) ballots. The scheme allows voters to combine voting credentials with their chosen votes applying the homomorphic properties of certain probabilistic cryptosystems.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2004-05-07: last updated
- 2004-05-07: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2004/105
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/105,
author = {Alessandro Acquisti},
title = {Receipt-Free Homomorphic Elections and Write-in Ballots},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/105},
year = {2004},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/105}
}