Paper 2004/110 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2004/110 ↗
Designing Against the `Overdefined System of Equations' Attack
Abstract
Recently, Courtois and Pieprzyk proposed an attack on symmetric ciphers that takes advantage of a previously-unexploited property of substitution boxes, or s-boxes, in the round function. This paper gives a brief overview of this ``overdefined system of equations'' attack and shows how the attack may be avoided through the use of round functions that contain a variety of protection mechanisms, including combinations of operators from different algebraic groups, a circular rotation step, and substitution boxes (s-boxes) of large dimension.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2004-05-11: last updated
- 2004-05-11: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2004/110
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/110,
author = {Carlisle Adams},
title = {Designing Against the `Overdefined System of Equations' Attack},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/110},
year = {2004},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/110}
}