Paper 2004/139 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2004/139 ↗
New Notions of Security: Achieving Universal Composability without Trusted Setup
Abstract
We propose a modification to the framework of Universally Composable (UC) security [Canetti'01]. Our new notion, involves comparing the protocol executions with an ideal execution involving ideal functionalities (just as in UC-security), but allowing the environment and adversary access to some super-polynomial computational power. We argue the meaningfulness of the new notion, which in particular subsumes many of the traditional notions of security. We generalize the Universal Composition theorem of [Canetti'01] to the new setting. Then under new computational assumptions, we realize secure multi-party computation (for static adversaries) without a common reference string or any other set-up assumptions, in the new framework. This is known to be impossible under the UC framework.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2004-06-16: last updated
- 2004-06-16: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2004/139
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/139,
author = {Manoj Prabhakaran and Amit Sahai},
title = {New Notions of Security: Achieving Universal Composability without Trusted Setup},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/139},
year = {2004},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/139}
}