Paper 2004/148 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2004/148 ↗

Provably Secure Delegation-by-Certification Proxy Signature Schemes

Zuowen Tan
Zhuojun Liu
Abstract

In this paper, we first show that previous proxy signature schemes by delegation with certificate are not provably secure under adaptive-chosen message attacks and adaptive-chosen warrant attacks. The schemes do not provide the strong undeniability. Then we construct a proxy signature scheme by delegation with certificate based on Co-GDH group from bilinear map. Our proxy signature scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptive-chosen message attacks and adaptive-chosen warrant attacks in random oracle model. We adopt a straight method of security reduction in which our scheme's security is reduced to hardness of the computational co-Diffie-Hellem problem. The proposed signature scheme is the first secure delegation-by-certificate proxy signature based on co-GDH groups from bilinear maps under the formal security model in random oracle model.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2004-07-07: last updated
2004-07-07: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2004/148
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/148,
      author = {Zuowen Tan and Zhuojun Liu},
      title = {Provably Secure Delegation-by-Certification Proxy Signature Schemes},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/148},
      year = {2004},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/148}
}
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