Paper 2004/175 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2004/175 ↗

A Proof of Yao's Protocol for Secure Two-Party Computation

Yehuda Lindell
Benny Pinkas
Abstract

In the mid 1980's, Yao presented a constant-round protocol for securely computing any two-party functionality in the presence of semi-honest adversaries (FOCS 1986). In this paper, we provide a complete description of Yao's protocol, along with a rigorous proof of security. Despite the importance of Yao's protocol to the field of secure computation, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that a proof of security has been published.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2011-01-11: last updated
2004-07-23: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2004/175
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/175,
      author = {Yehuda Lindell and Benny Pinkas},
      title = {A Proof of Yao's Protocol for Secure Two-Party Computation},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/175},
      year = {2004},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/175}
}
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