Paper 2004/205 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2004/205 ↗
Direct Anonymous Attestation
Abstract
This paper describes the direct anonymous attestation scheme (DAA). This scheme was adopted by the Trusted Computing Group as the method for remote authentication of a hardware module, called trusted platform module (TPM), while preserving the privacy of the user of the platform that contains the module. Direct anonymous attestation can be seen as a group signature without the feature that a signature can be opened, i.e., the anonymity is not revocable. Moreover, DAA allows for pseudonyms, i.e., for each signature a user (in agreement with the recipient of the signature) can decide whether or not the signature should be linkable to another signature. DAA furthermore allows for detection of ``known'' keys: if the DAA secret keys are extracted from a TPM and published, a verifier can detect that a signature was produced using these secret keys. The scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model under the strong RSA and the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2004-08-21: last updated
- 2004-08-21: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2004/205
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/205,
author = {Ernie Brickell and Jan Camenisch and Liqun Chen},
title = {Direct Anonymous Attestation},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/205},
year = {2004},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/205}
}