Paper 2004/221 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2004/221 ↗
Towards Plaintext-Aware Public-Key Encryption without Random Oracles
Abstract
We consider the problem of defining and achieving plaintext-aware encryption without random oracles in the classical public-key model. We provide definitions for a hierarchy of notions of increasing strength: PA0, PA1 and PA2, chosen so that PA1+IND-CPA => IND-CCA1 and PA2+IND-CPA => IND-CCA2. Towards achieving the new notions of plaintext awareness, we show that a scheme due to Damgard, denoted DEG, and the ``lite'' version of the Cramer-Shoup scheme, denoted CSL, are both PA0 under the KEA0 assumption of Damgard, and PA1 under an extension of this assumption called KEA1. As a result, DEG is the most efficient proven IND-CCA1 scheme known.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2004-09-02: last updated
- 2004-09-02: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2004/221
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/221,
author = {Mihir Bellare and Adriana Palacio},
title = {Towards Plaintext-Aware Public-Key Encryption without Random Oracles},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/221},
year = {2004},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/221}
}