Paper 2004/232 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2004/232 ↗
Extending the Resynchronization Attack
Abstract
Synchronous stream ciphers need perfect synchronization between sender and receiver. In practical applications, this is ensured by a resync mechanism. Daemen et al first described attacks on ciphers using such a resync mechanism. In this paper, we extend their attacks in several ways by combining the standard attack with several cryptanalytic techniques such as algebraic attacks and linear cryptanalysis. Our results show that using linear resync mechanisms should be avoided, and give lower bounds for the nonlinearity required from a secure resync mechanism.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2004-09-20: last updated
- 2004-09-13: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2004/232
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/232,
author = {Frederik Armknecht and Joseph Lano and Bart Preneel},
title = {Extending the Resynchronization Attack},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/232},
year = {2004},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/232}
}