Paper 2004/243 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2004/243 ↗
On the Key Exposure Problem in Chameleon Hashes
Abstract
Chameleon signatures were introduced by Krawczyk and Rabin, being non-interactive signature schemes that provide non-transferability. However, that first construction employs a chameleon hash that suffers from a key exposure problem: The non-transferability property requires willingness of the recipient in consequentially exposing a secret key, and therefore invalidating all signatures issued to the same recipient's public key. To address this key-revocation issue, and its attending problems of key redistribution, storage of state information, and greater need for interaction, an identity-based scheme was proposed in [1], while a fully key-exposure free construction, based on the elliptic curves with pairings, appeared later in [7]. Herein we provide several constructions of exposure-free chameleon hash functions based on different cryptographic assumptions, such as the RSA and the discrete logarithm assumptions. One of the schemes is a novel construction that relies on a single trapdoor and therefore may potentially be realized over a large set of cryptographic groups (where the discrete logarithm is hard).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2004-09-22: last updated
- 2004-09-22: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2004/243
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/243,
author = {Giuseppe Ateniese and Breno de Medeiros},
title = {On the Key Exposure Problem in Chameleon Hashes},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/243},
year = {2004},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/243}
}