Paper 2004/273 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2004/273 ↗
Cryptanalysis of Threshold-Multisignature schemes
Abstract
In [1], Li et al. proposed a new type of signature scheme, called the $(t,n)$ threshold-mutisignature scheme. The first one needs a mutually trusted share distribution center (SDC) while the second one does not. In this paper, we present a security analysis on their second schemes. We point out that their second threshold-multisignature scheme is vulnerable to universal forgery by an insider attacker under reasonable assumptions. In our attack, $(n-t+1)$ colluding members can control the group secret key. Therefore, they can generate valid threshold-multisignautre for any message without the help of other members. Furthermore, honest members cannot detect this security flaw in the system, since any $t$ members can generate threshold-multisignatures according to the prescribed protocols.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2004-10-21: last updated
- 2004-10-21: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2004/273
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/273,
author = {Lifeng Guo},
title = {Cryptanalysis of Threshold-Multisignature schemes},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/273},
year = {2004},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/273}
}