Paper 2004/283 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2004/283 ↗
Fault and Side-Channel Attacks on Pairing Based Cryptography
Abstract
Current side-channel analytic attacks against public key cryptography focus on traditional schemes such as RSA and ECC, and to a lesser extent primitives such as XTR. However, bilinear maps, or pairings, have presented theorists with a new and increasingly popular way of constructing cryptographic protocols. Most notably, this has resulted in efficient methods for Identity Based Encryption (IBE). Since identity based cryptography seems an ideal partner for identity aware devices such as smart-cards, in this paper we examine the security of concrete pairing instantiations in terms of side-channel analysis.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2004-11-03: last updated
- 2004-11-03: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2004/283
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/283,
author = {D. Page and F. Vercauteren},
title = {Fault and Side-Channel Attacks on Pairing Based Cryptography},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/283},
year = {2004},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/283}
}