Paper 2004/325 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2004/325 ↗
Complexity of the Collision and Near-Collision Attack on SHA-0 with Different Message Schedules
Abstract
SHA-0 employs a primitive polynomnial of degree 16 over GF(2) in its message schedule. There are 2048 primitive polynomials of degree 16 over GF(2). For each primitive polynomial, a SHA-0 variant can be constructed. In this paper, the security of 2048 variants is analyzed against the Chabaud-Joux attack proposed in CRYPTO'98. The analysis shows that all the variants could be collision-attacked by using near-collisions as a tool and thus the replacement of the primitive polynomial is not a proper way to make SHA-0 secure. However, it is shown that the selection of the variants highly affects the complexity of the attack. Furthermore, a collision in the most vulnerable variant is presented. It is obtained by the original Chabaud-Joux attack without any improvements.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2005-02-14: last updated
- 2004-11-26: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2004/325
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/325,
author = {Mitsuhiro HATTORI and Shoichi HIROSE and Susumu YOSHIDA},
title = {Complexity of the Collision and Near-Collision Attack on SHA-0 with Different Message Schedules},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/325},
year = {2004},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/325}
}