Paper 2004/343 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2004/343 ↗
Revisit Of McCullagh--Barreto Two-Party ID-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols
Abstract
The recently proposed two-party ID-based authenticated key agreement protocols (with and without escrow) and its variant resistant to key-compromise impersonation by McCullagh & Barreto are revisited. The protocol carries a proof of security in the Bellare & Rogaway (1993) model. In this paper, it is demonstrated that the protocols and its variant are not secure if the adversary is allowed to send a Reveal query to reveal non-partner players who had accepted the same session key.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2004-12-08: last updated
- 2004-12-07: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2004/343
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/343,
author = {Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo},
title = {Revisit Of McCullagh--Barreto Two-Party ID-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/343},
year = {2004},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/343}
}