On Resistance of DES to Related-Key Differential Cryptanalysis

Goce Jakimoski; Yvo Desmedt

Paper 2005/084 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2005/084 ↗

On Resistance of DES to Related-Key Differential Cryptanalysis

Goce Jakimoski

Yvo Desmedt

Abstract

The key schedule of the Data Encryption Standard is analyzed, and it is shown that the properties of the permuted choice PC-2 transformation and the number of bits that are left shifted during the key generation are critical for the security of the algorithm. More precisely, we were able to mount a low complexity related-key attack on DES with slightly modified key schedule although no related-key attack is known for the original algorithm.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2005-03-20: last updated; 2005-03-20: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2005/084
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2005/084,
      author = {Goce Jakimoski and Yvo Desmedt},
      title = {On Resistance of DES to Related-Key Differential Cryptanalysis},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2005/084},
      year = {2005},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/084}
}