Paper 2005/107 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2005/107 ↗
A Uniform Framework for Cryptanalysis of the Bluetooth $E_0$ Cipher
Abstract
In this paper we analyze the $E_0$ cipher, which is the encryption system used in the Bluetooth specification. We suggest a uniform framework for cryptanalysis of the $E_0$ cipher. Our method requires 128 known bits of the keystream in order to recover the initial state of the LFSRs, which reflects the secret key of this encryption engine. In one setting, our framework reduces to an attack of D. Bleichenbacher. In another setting, our framework is equivalent to an attack presented by Fluhrer and Lucks. Our best attack can recover the initial state of the LFSRs after solving $2^{86}$ boolean linear systems of equations, which is roughly equivalent to the results obtained by Fluhrer and Lucks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2005-04-14: last updated
- 2005-04-14: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2005/107
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2005/107,
author = {Ophir Levy and Avishai Wool},
title = {A Uniform Framework for Cryptanalysis of the Bluetooth $E_0$ Cipher},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2005/107},
year = {2005},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/107}
}