Paper 2005/150 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2005/150 ↗
Secure Delegation of Elliptic-Curve Pairing
Abstract
In this paper we describe a simple protocol for securely delegating elliptic-curve pairings. A computationally limited device (typically a smart-card) will delegate the computation of the pairing e(A,B) to a more powerful device (for example a PC), in such a way that: 1. the powerful device learns nothing about the points being paired (A and B), nor about the pairing’s result e(A,B), 2. and the limited device is able to detect when the powerful device is cheating. We also describe more efficient variants of our protocol when one of the points or both are already known, and further efficiency gains when constant points are used.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2005-05-26: last updated
- 2005-05-26: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2005/150
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2005/150,
author = {Benoit Chevallier-Mames and Jean-Sebastien Coron and Noel McCullagh and David Naccache and Michael Scott},
title = {Secure Delegation of Elliptic-Curve Pairing},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2005/150},
year = {2005},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/150}
}