Paper 2005/190 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2005/190 ↗
Security Proof of "Efficient and Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Transport Protocol Based on RSA"
Abstract
In this paper, we prove the security of the {\sf RSA-AKE} protocol \cite{SKI05} in the random oracle model. The proof states that the {\sf RSA-AKE} protocol is secure against an adversary who gets the client's stored secret \emph{or} the server's RSA private key.\footnote{The protocol is the same as \cite{SKI05}, but we corrected the security proof partially. The attacks appeared in \cite{TM05} are no longer available in the proof since the adversary has access to either the client's stored secret or the server's private key, not both of them.} To our best knowledge, the {\sf RSA-AKE} protocol is the most efficient among their kinds (i.e., RSA and password based AKE protocols). The other security properties and efficiency measurements of the {\sf RSA-AKE} protocol remain the same as in \cite{SKI05}.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2006-05-15: last updated
- 2005-06-23: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2005/190
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2005/190,
author = {SeongHan Shin and Kazukuni Kobara and Hideki Imai},
title = {Security Proof of "Efficient and Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Transport Protocol Based on RSA"},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2005/190},
year = {2005},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/190}
}