Paper 2005/205 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2005/205 ↗
Another look at HMQV
Abstract
HMQV is a `hashed variant' of the MQV key agreement protocol. It was recently introduced by Krawczyk, who claimed that HMQV has very significant advantages over MQV: (i) a security proof under reasonable assumptions in the (extended) Canetti-Krawczyk model for key exchange; and (ii) superior performance in some situations. In this paper we demonstrate that HMQV is insecure by presenting realistic attacks in the Canetti-Krawczyk model that recover a victim's static private key. We propose HMQV-1, a patched version of HMQV that resists our attacks (but does not have any performance advantages over MQV). We also identify the fallacies in the security proof for HMQV, critique the security model, and raise some questions about the assurances that proofs in this model can provide.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2011-08-15: last updated
- 2005-06-30: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2005/205
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2005/205,
author = {Alfred Menezes},
title = {Another look at HMQV},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2005/205},
year = {2005},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/205}
}