Attack on Okamoto  et al.'s New Short Signature Schemes

Fangguo Zhang; Xiaofeng Chen

Paper 2005/240 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2005/240 ↗

Attack on Okamoto et al.'s New Short Signature Schemes

Fangguo Zhang

Xiaofeng Chen

Abstract

We present an attack on a new short signature scheme from bilinear pairing proposed by Okamoto $et$ $al.$ at ITCC'05. We show that any one can derive the secret key of the signer from any two message-signature pairs and so can forge the signer's signature for any message. This means the scheme is totally broken.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2005-07-30: last updated; 2005-07-30: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2005/240
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2005/240,
      author = {Fangguo Zhang and Xiaofeng Chen},
      title = {Attack on Okamoto  et al.'s New Short Signature Schemes},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2005/240},
      year = {2005},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/240}
}