Paper 2005/284 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2005/284 ↗

Foundations and Applications for Secure Triggers

Ariel Futoransky
Emiliano Kargieman
Carlos Sarraute
Ariel Waissbein
Abstract

Imagine there is certain content we want to maintain private until some particular event occurs, when we want to have it automatically disclosed. Suppose furthermore, that we want this done in a (possibly) malicious host. Say, the confidential content is a piece of code belonging to a computer program that should remain ciphered and then ``be triggered'' (i.e., deciphered and executed) when the underlying system satisfies a preselected condition which must remain secret after code inspection. In this work we present different solutions for problems of this sort, using different ``declassification'' criteria, based on a primitive we call {\em secure triggers}. We establish the notion of secure triggers in the universally-composable security framework of [Canetti~2001] and introduce several examples. Our examples demonstrate that a new sort of obfuscation is possible. Finally, we motivate its use with applications in realistic scenarios.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2005-08-25: last updated
2005-08-25: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2005/284
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2005/284,
      author = {Ariel Futoransky and Emiliano Kargieman and Carlos Sarraute and Ariel Waissbein},
      title = {Foundations and Applications for Secure Triggers},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2005/284},
      year = {2005},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/284}
}
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