Paper 2005/379 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2005/379 ↗
Handling Expected Polynomial-Time Strategies in Simulation-Based Security Proofs
Abstract
The standard class of adversaries considered in cryptography is that of {\em strict} polynomial-time probabilistic machines. However, {\em expected} polynomial-time machines are often also considered. For example, there are many zero-knowledge protocols for which the only known simulation techniques run in expected (and not strict) polynomial time. In addition, it has been shown that expected polynomial-time simulation is {\em essential} for achieving constant-round black-box zero-knowledge protocols. This reliance on expected polynomial-time simulation introduces a number of conceptual and technical difficulties. In this paper, we develop techniques for dealing with expected polynomial-time adversaries in simulation-based security proofs.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2006-07-20: last updated
- 2005-10-23: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2005/379
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2005/379,
author = {Jonathan Katz and Yehuda Lindell},
title = {Handling Expected Polynomial-Time Strategies in Simulation-Based Security Proofs},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2005/379},
year = {2005},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/379}
}