Paper 2005/451 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2005/451 ↗

Weaknesses of the Boyd-Mao Deniable Authenticated key Establishment for Internet Protocols

Jue-Sam Chou
Yalin Chen
Ming-De Yang
Abstract

In 2003, Boyd and Mao proposed two deniable authenticated key establishment protocols using elliptic curve pairings for Internet protocols, one is based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange and the other is based on Public-Key Encryption approach. For the use of elliptic curve pairings, they declared that their schemes could be more efficient than the existing Internet Key Exchange (IKE), nowadays. However in this paper, we will show that both of Boyd-Mao¡¦s protocols suffer from the key-Compromise Impersonation attack.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2005-12-14: last updated
2005-12-14: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2005/451
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2005/451,
      author = {Jue-Sam Chou and Yalin Chen and Ming-De Yang},
      title = {Weaknesses of the Boyd-Mao Deniable Authenticated key Establishment for Internet Protocols},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2005/451},
      year = {2005},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/451}
}
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